

# Citizens Charter Afghanistan Project – Conflict & Fragility Study

Presentation of Findings & Recommendations  
February 2020

ATR Consulting

# Overview

- ▶ Objectives & Scope
- ▶ Research Questions
- ▶ District Selection
- ▶ Methodology
- ▶ Key Findings
- ▶ Recommendations
- ▶ Questions

# Objectives & Scope

- ▶ **Baseline:** For subsequent review of how the project reduces, contributes to, and/or reshapes conflict and fragility
- ▶ Provide insights on how **service delivery** and **legitimacy** are linked in these communities
- ▶ Develop operational recommendations on how Community Development Councils (CDCs) specifically, and the CCAP in general, can play a positive role in improving **social cohesion**, reducing **fragility**, and building **public trust** in local institutions at the village level and upward
- ▶ Identify **obstacles** and **threats** to the successful implementation of the CCAP, along with potential **mitigation strategies**
- ▶ **Learning:** Highlight emerging risks and lessons from early field activities

# District Selection


## ▶ **Representation**

- ▶ Aimed to reflect the diversity of situations and experiences in Afghanistan
- ▶ Expanded from 3 to 5 districts to increase representativeness

## ▶ **Selection Criteria**

- ▶ Regional Diversity
- ▶ Topographical Differences
- ▶ Ethnic Diversity
- ▶ Security
- ▶ Potential Drivers of Conflict (criminality, insurgency, ethnic cleavages, resources)
- ▶ Fragile Situations (influx of IDPs/returnees, governance issues)
- ▶ Urban / Rural

# District Selection



# Methodology

- ▶ **Literature Review**
  - ▶ Citizens' Charter program documents
  - ▶ Academic and empirical literature on:
    - ▶ Conflict and stabilization in CDD in Afghanistan
    - ▶ Social norms in conflict-ridden societies
    - ▶ Policies to improve service delivery and social mobility
- ▶ **Consultations**
  - ▶ Workshop with facilitating partners
- ▶ **District & Village Profiles (16)**
  - ▶ Review of data from Citizens' Charter MIS
  - ▶ Key informant interviews (32)
  - ▶ Informal discussions

# Methodology (continued)

- ▶ **Household, Mohalla, Village & Cluster-Level Research**
  - ▶ IDIs with power-holders & CDC members (56)
  - ▶ Iterative informal discussions (788)
- ▶ **Service Delivery Assessment**
  - ▶ Village-level project database
  - ▶ Interviews with civil servants
  - ▶ Service delivery, score card, & DCMC/MCMC observation tools
- ▶ **Household Survey**
  - ▶ 1,600+ respondents (400+ per district)
  - ▶ 25 communities per district (highly representative)

# Key findings

- ▶ CC seen as **reducing tensions and resolving grievances** (Panjwayi = 82% positive opinion)
- ▶ 59% of men across the study areas claim they **trust their CDC “a lot”**.
- ▶ CC does **not appear to create tensions**.
- ▶ Visible potential for CCAP to contribute to social cohesion if safeguards are strictly implemented, to mitigate the **high risk that pre-existing conflicts be exploited**
- ▶ Need to increase **efforts for meaningful participation of women** in some areas
- ▶ Increase use of High Risk Area Implementation Strategy and ensure strict enforcement of the policy



# Key Factors Differentiating Conflict Dynamics

## ▶ **Panjwayi**

- ▶ Government control post-2014 has produced relative security
  - ▶ Tribal politics based on historical ties to Taliban or government
- ▶ Past conflict drove migration patterns that shaped the area
  - ▶ Wealthy families fled to Kandahar; IDPs have settled recently
- ▶ Disputes between government officials over land, militias, and resources

## ▶ **Matun**

- ▶ Interfamilial resource competition
- ▶ Long-standing disputes between tribes or clans
- ▶ Drawdown of international forces has contributed to stability

# Key Factors Differentiating Conflict Dynamics

## ▶ Herat

- ▶ Low social cohesion influenced by new arrivals
- ▶ Access to government resources a source of conflict
- ▶ Urban criminality and drug addiction

## ▶ Jalrez

- ▶ Active fighting between insurgents and government forces
  - ▶ Started during early stages of CCAP
- ▶ Taliban have established parallel government structures
- ▶ Preference to resolve conflicts without involving Taliban or government

# Social Cohesion at the Local Level

- ▶ **Insecurity** perceived as the most critical factor
  - ▶ But external threats can promote unity and cooperation (Jalrez)
- ▶ Systematic conflict over **natural resources** (especially in rural areas)
- ▶ **Migration** seen as a source of division (Herat, Panjwayi)
- ▶ **Ethnicity** contributes to division, but not necessarily tension
- ▶ Growing divide between **rich** and **poor** threatens social cohesion

# Drivers of Conflict & Pathways to Resolution or Conflict Expansion

## ▶ **Main Drivers of Conflict**


- ▶ Land (rural locations)
- ▶ Water
- ▶ Political leadership
- ▶ Access to government resources

## ▶ **Pathways to Resolution / Expansion**

- ▶ Elders remain critically important, especially in rural areas
- ▶ Taliban and militias remain major spoilers (Panjwayi)
- ▶ District officials accused of negative role in Jalrez

# Drivers of Conflict & Pathways to Resolution or Conflict Expansion

Please consider all local conflicts in your area over the past 5 years. What were most conflicts about?



# Conflict & Service Delivery

- ▶ No evidence that CCAP creates conflict – CCAP, in some cases, **reshape existing conflicts**
- ▶ Service providers **adapt implementation** on a day-to-day basis
  - ▶ Incentive not to report deviations from the rules
  - ▶ Emphasis on delivering services regardless of performance on social mobilization
- ▶ **Insecurity** may **enhance cooperation** around service delivery
- ▶ **Human resource** challenges undermine service delivery
- ▶ **Insecure roads** inhibit access to services
- ▶ Destruction of / **failure to maintain schools**

# Service Delivery & Trust in the State

- ▶ Too early to gauge effectively
- ▶ Preliminary trends suggest **improved perceptions** of CDCs
- ▶ **Patronage** and **service delivery** perceived to be linked
  - ▶ Connections to prominent figures key to benefits
- ▶ **Perceived impunity** of government officials undermines legitimacy
- ▶ Government's provision of **security** is the most important service for triggering trust and legitimacy
- ▶ **Taliban using service delivery** to enhance their own legitimacy

# Impact of External Events on Local Political Dynamics

- ▶ **Macro-level events**
  - ▶ Insurgency / Ongoing violence
  - ▶ Parliamentary elections
  - ▶ Displacement & migration
- ▶ **Meso-level politics**
  - ▶ Power struggle for CCAP-generated resources
- ▶ **Micro-level conflicts**
  - ▶ Local figures use CCAP to strengthen their positions



# Challenges

- ▶ Infrastructure **Delivery vs. Democratization**
  - ▶ Taliban oppose election process, large gatherings and women's participation, but not the hard component
- ▶ **Security / Do No Harm**
  - ▶ How do you operate without putting people and systems at risk?
- ▶ Balancing **Local Norms** and **Participation / Inclusiveness**
  - ▶ Both are essential components of legitimacy
- ▶ Trade-offs between **Social Cohesion** and **Services**

# Recommendations

- ▶ Developing conflict sensitivity measures as part of the existing manuals
- ▶ Training FPs and PMUs on conflict sensitivity and on risks that can arise from the CC implementation (risk of domestic violence, the risk linked to Taliban pressure related to access negotiations, etc)
- ▶ Developing avenues for increasing dialogue on risks for conflict and red lines, including at the policy and programmatic levels
- ▶ Build on successes where facilitation successfully address community-level resistance to specific requirements

# Recommendations (continued)

- ▶ Define outcomes and monitor them to measure successes other than direct access to services.
- ▶ Developing a process (with resources if needs be) to follow up and address issues found during monitoring
  - ▶ For instance: following report of an improper implementation (soft or hard), stop other activities up to the time error or fraud are addressed.
- ▶ Develop a policy that lists sanctions (including soft sanctions) for various levels of violations. Set up the structure for implementing the policy.
  - ▶ Policy to balance flexibility and strict limits

# Recommendations (continued)

- ▶ Improve communication toward the citizens targeted by the program to prevent patronage networks or Taliban from claiming credit for the CCAP
- ▶ Conduct organizational and institutional review of the key divisions to evaluate if they are sufficiently equipped and supported to properly oversee the implementation of the program.
- ▶ Increasing the number of female staff in the field: decrease education requirements for female field staff, adapt written reporting requirement, increase mobilization period.
- ▶ To encourage women participation and interest in the program, consider small grants specifically aimed at addressing women's priority needs (including the training of one community-based midwife, the availability of a social organizer or a psycho-social counselor, etc.).

# Questions?

- ▶ Objectives & Scope
- ▶ Research Questions
- ▶ District Selection
- ▶ Methodology
- ▶ Key Findings
- ▶ Recommendations



Thank You